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THE OPPORTUNITY IN ADEQUACY LITIGATION:
RECOGNIZING THE LEGITIMACY AND VALUE OF
PURSUING EDUCATIONAL REFORM THROUGH THE
COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
After more than ten years of litigation, South Carolina is on the brink of
discovering whether the state's education system is due for a major overhaul.
Following the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in Abbeville County School
District v. State,1 the Clarendon County Circuit Court must determine whether the
state is fulfilling its constitutional obligation to provide South Carolina studenis
with a "minimally adequate education."2 The plaintiffs are "less wealthy," rural
public school districts that initially brought suit against the state in 1993. While
the pursuit of educational reform through the courts may be cast as a disquieting
innovation by members of the state's judicial and political branches, the pending
litigation in South Carolina is part of a national trend that began more than thirty
years ago.4 Most states have faced legal challenges to their education systems,'
although the nature of the claims has changed over time. The most recent
challenges are based on education clauses found in state constitutions and address
the quality of education provided rather than simply the amount or distribution of
funding.6 Courts interpret such clauses as establishing an affirmative duty on the
states to provide adequacy in education!
This Note examines the most recent installment in South Carolina's educational
adequacy litigation in light of national trends at the state level. In South Carolina,
judges' inhibitions about transgressing the boundaries of the judicial role threaten
to limit the efficacy of education adequacy litigation. The South Carolina courts
must assume a more active role, however, in light of the state's history of
1. 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999).
2. Id. at 69, 515 S.E.2d at 540-41.
3. Id. at 63, 515 S.E.2d at 538.
4. For an overview on the history of school finance litigation, see National Conference of State
Legislatures, Education Finance Litigation: History, Issues and Current Status, at
http'//www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/LitigationCon.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2005).
5. As of 2002, at least forty-three states faced legal challenges to the constitutionality of their
education systems. Liz Kramer, Note, Achieving Equitable Education Through the Courts: A
Comparative Analysis of Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 6 (2002).
6. For a discussion on how the focus of school funding cases has turned from equity to adequacy,
see Patricia F. First & Barbara M. De Luca, The Meaning of Educational Adequacy: The Confusion of
DeRolph, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 185, 188-90 (2003); National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note
4, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/LitigationCon.htm.
7. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205, 211 (Ky. 1989) (holding the
state constitutional guarantee of an "efficient system of common schools... requires the General
Assembly to establish a system of common schools that provides an equal opportunity for children to
have an adequate education"); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997) (holding that the
North Carolina Constitution's guarantee of "a general and uniform system of free public schools"
amount to a qualitative right to a "sound basic education"); Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 67-68, 515 S.E.2d
at 539-40 (holding that the General Assembly's constitutional duty to "provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free public education" guarantees the right to a "minimally adequate education").
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neglecting education to the detriment of the public at large. Educational reform
through the courts is justified given the inherent flexibility of the separation of
powers doctrine at the state level and the courts' ability to draw from the constantly
evolving case law and reforms from other states. With an eye toward reforming the
ailing educational system and benefiting society as a whole, South Carolina state
courts and policy makers should follow the lead of other state courts in assuming
broad interpretations of educational adequacy and opportunity.
Part II of this Note presents an overview of school reform litigation and its
evolution from a funding equity to an educational adequacy perspective. Part I
also describes the development of South Carolina's educational adequacy case in
Abbeville. Next, Part HI explains why the courts are an appropriate and legitimate
forum for educational reform. Part IV analyzes the definition of "educational
adequacy" in terms of its goal for reform as articulated by the South Carolina
Supreme Court and other state courts. Part V discusses the meaning of opportunity
as it applies to the state's duty under South Carolina's education clause. Finally,
Part VI argues for South Carolina courts and policy makers to take steps toward
reform because of the importance of an adequate education, not only for the benefit
of children in the plaintiff districts, but for the good of the state as a whole.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of School Reform Litigation
The evolution of school reform litigation developed in three "waves."' The
first wave of litigation began in 1971 with the California Supreme Court's decision
in Serrano v. Priest.9 In Serrano, the plaintiffs successfully challenged the state's
education finance scheme based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause."0 According to the plaintiffs, the state's heavy reliance on local property
taxes to fund its schools led to "substantial disparities in the quality
and ... availability of educational opportunities ... among the several school
districts of the State."" The plaintiffs argued that the financing scheme violated the
Fourteenth Amendment because the quality of education within a given district was
dependent on its inhabitants' wealth.' The California Supreme Court agreed and
invalidated the financing systembecause it denied plaintiffs' equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Finding education a fundamental right and wealth
a suspect classification, the court applied a strict scrutiny standard."
The first wave was short-lived because the United States Supreme Court's 1973
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez5 precluded
reliance on the Equal Protection Clause as an avenue for education finance
8. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions
on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219,222 (1990).
9. Id. at 223 n.22 (citing Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971)).
10. See Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244 (citing U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1). Plaintiffs were Los
Angeles County public school children and their parents. Id. at 1244.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1263.
14. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
15. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[Vol. 56: 761
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reform. 6 The case came before the Texas District Court on facts similar to
Serrano, and the court was as receptive to the plaintiffs' claims as the California
Supreme Court was to the Serrano plaintiffs' claims. 7 The Supreme Court
reversed the district court's decision, however, finding that Texas's school
financing scheme passed muster under the less stringent rational basis standard.'
Although the Court stressed the importance of education, it decided that education
was not a fundamental right under the Constitution and held that wealth was not a
suspect classification.' 9
With no hope for relief in federal court after the first wave of litigation,
plaintiffs in the second wave turned to their respective state courts, beginning with
Robinson v. Cahill in 1973.20 During the second wave, plaintiffs sought education
finance reform based on education clauses and equal protection clauses in their
state constitutions.2 " Despite the available bases for remedies in ever.
state,2plaintiffs' reform efforts during the second wave met with limited success.
Finally, in 1989 Helena, Rose, and Edgewood ushered in the third wave.2"
These three decisions represented a new trend because they invalidated school
financing schemes based solely on education clauses.2" The Kentucky Supreme
Court took its decision in Rose v. Councilfor Better Education one step further by
using the education clause to declare its entire public school system
unconstitutional. 6 This broad decision demonstrated that "school finance reform
litigation may be proven to be a road to more general educational reform."27 As the
third wave progressed, focus shifted from financial equity to educational adequacy
as it became apparent that equal distribution of funding did not necessarily improve
educational outcomes. Professors James Liebman and Charles Sabel, leading
16. See Thro, supra note 8, at 224-25 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973)).
17. Compare Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16, with supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (finding
for the plaintiffs based on constitutional arguments). Plaintiffs in Rodriguez were "Mexican-American
parents whose children attend[ed] ... schools in the Edgewood Independent School District, an urban
school district in San Antonio, Texas." Id. at 4-5.
18. Id. at 55.
19. Id. at 28-40.
20. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cited in Thro, supra note 8, at 228-29.
21. Thro, supra note 8, at 228-29. Mississippi is the only state that lacks an education clause. Id.
at 229. Each state's education clause guarantees "at a minimum... some sort of system of free public
education." Id. In addition, each state constitution contains a provision that a court could interpret to
guaranty equal protection. Id. at 229-31 nn.49-54.
22. See supra note 21.
23. For six victories, fifteen defeats occurred, including a defeat in South Carolina. Thro, supra
note 8, at 232 nn.62-63.
24. See Thro, supra note 8, at 233-43 (citing Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769
P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Edgewood
Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989)).
25. See Thro, supra note 8, at 239.
26. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215, cited in Thro, supra note 8, at 236.
27. Thro, supra note 8, at 239.
28. See First & De Luca, supra note 6, at 190. From its inception, Abbeville exemplified the
movement away from equity and towards adequacy: "[A]ppellants do not seek 'equal' state funding
since they already receive more than wealthier districts, but instead allege that the funding results in an
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scholars on contemporary education reform explained, "[A]dequacy no longer
connotes financial adequacy.... What counts is the adequacy of the outcome, not
the cross-district equality of the inputs."29 Despite the popular misconception,3"
Abbeville is an educational adequacy case.3' Though the case began as a challenge
to funding, the ultimate issue on remand is whether South Carolina is providing its
students with a minimally adequate education.32 Funding remains an important
background issue only to the extent that "every judicial order implies an allocation
of public funds sufficient to enforce it."33 This distinction is important, in part,
because educational adequacy cases "rais[e] many legal and factual questions that
typically are resolved over the course of several decisions."'
29. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183,205
(2003).
30. The media incorrectly characterizes Abbeville as a school finance case. The following
headlines illustrate the misconception: James T. Hammond, Poor Schools Renew Battle for Funding,
GREENVILLE NEWS (S.C.), July 28, 2003, at IA; Paul Krohne, Important Questions on Funding Our
Public Schools, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 20, 2004, at A15; Beth Padgett, Poor Districts
Already Get More Funds, GREENVILLE NEWS (S.C.), Aug. 3, 2003, at IA; Bill Robinson & John C.
Drake, School Funding Trial Opens in Manning; Districts' Lawyer Accuses State of 'Continuing
Neglect, 'THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), July 29, 2003, at Al. This media-perpetuated misunderstanding
could have detrimental effects at the remedial stage. For example, in New Jersey "white
citizens... inaccurately perceived school finance reform as primarily benefiting blacks," leading to
strong public opposition to remedial efforts. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance
Reform, 98 MicH. L. REV. 432, 432-33 (1999). The public, the courts, and policymakers need to
understand Abbeville as an educational adequacy case that holds benefits for all South Carolinians. See
infra notes 53-57, 92-97 and accompanying text. South Carolina must view the case as one for
educational adequacy, particularly because of serious questions raised as to the efficacy of finance-
based reforms. See, e.g., Jeffrey Metzler, Inequitable Equilibrium: School Finance in the United States,
36 IND. L. REV. 561, 563 (2003) ("After conducting an empirical analysis . . . I learned that no
connection can be made between a state's basic approach to education finance and the equality of
educational opportunity provided to students."); Virginia Postrel, A Texas Experiment That Shifts Money
from Rich to Poor School Districts is Turning into a Major Policy Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2004,
at C2 (describing the failure of Texas's school finance equalization program).
31. See Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 69, 515 S.E.2d at 541 (1999).
32. Id.
33. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1015, 1059 (2004); see also Deborah A. Verstegen, The Law ofFinancing
Education: Towards a Theory ofAdequacy: The Continuing Saga of Equal Educational Opportunity
in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School Finance Systems, 23 ST. Louis U. PuB. L.
REV. 499, 528 (2004) ("Resource indicators of adequacy... include opportunities provided to children
in schools and classrooms, such as the depth and breadth of curriculum, teacher quality, the ability to
attract and retain quality teachers, facilities needs and safety, class sizes, budget flexibility and stability,
and other input, output, and process indicators.").
34. Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting "Adequacy" In State Constitutions' Education
Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2245 (2003). An example of the complexity associated with
adequacy cases is Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 373 (N.C. 2004), where the trial
to determine whether North Carolina was providing students with a sound basic education "lasted
approximately fourteen months and resulted in over fifty boxes of exhibits and transcripts, an eight-
volume record on appeal, and a memorandum of decision that exceeds 400 pages." Id.
[Vol. 56:761
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B. School Reform Litigation in South Carolina
South Carolina's educational adequacy case began in 1993 when forty public
school districts sued the state, alleging that the state's education finance scheme
violated state and federal law.a5 Initially, the circuit court dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.36 After affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims
under state and federal equal protection clauses and South Carolina's Education
Finance Act (EFA), the supreme court went on to hold that the South Carolina
Constitution "requires the General Assembly to provide the opportunity for each
child to receive a minimally adequate education. '37 In so holding, the court
supplied interpretive content to the language of the state constitution's education
clause: "The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of
a system of free public schools open to all children in the state and shall establish,
organize and support such other public institutions of learning as may be
desirable."3a Absent from the bare language of the clause is any qualitative notion
of adequacy. Nonetheless, the court supported its holding by citing to other
jurisdictions' interpretations of similar language in their states' education clauses
and to the General Assembly's own acknowledgment under the Education Finance
Act (EFA) of the need for "the availability of at least minimum educational
programs and services." '39 While some commentators may find fault with the court
implying an adequacy standard in the education clause,' the court's opinion is




The circuit court is hearing Abbeville on remand to determine whether the state
is meeting its "constitutional duty . . . [of providing] a minimally adequate
education to each student in South Carolina."'42 The supreme court defined a
minimally adequate education:
[A minimally adequate education] includes providing students
adequate and safe facilities in which they have the opportunity to
acquire: 1) the ability to read, write, and speak the English
language, and knowledge of mathematics and physical science; 2)
35. Jennifer L. Fogle, Note, Abbeville County School District v. State: The Right to a Minimally
Adequate Education in South Carolina, 51 S.C. L. REV. 781, 782 (2000). Eight of the original forty
districts continue as parties to the litigation: Allendale, Dillon 2, Florence 4, Hampton 2, Jasper, Lee,
Marion 7 and Orangeburg 3. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., Adequacy in Education,
at http.//www.scschoolcase.com/education-trial-presentations.cfin (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
36. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 63, 515 S.E.2d 535, 538 (1999).
37. Id. at68, 515 S.E.2d at 540.
38. See id. at 66, 515 S.E.2d at 539 (quoting S.C. CoNST. art. XI, § 3).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-20-30 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (language unchanged in S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-20-30 (West 2004)), quoted in Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 65, 515 S.E.2d at 539.
40. See Fogle, supra note 35, at 804 (citing Thro, supra note 8). Fogle rightly questions Thro's
"'textual taxonomy' of education clauses" in light of the South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation
of the constitution's education clause. Id. at 804-05.
41. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. Furthermore, state politicians argue that
judicial intervention is consistent with reform efforts in South Carolina. See infra note 50 and
accompanying text, see also Garrow, infra note 53, at 244 (quoting State Senator John W. Matthews
Jr.: "Tlhe South has seen 'no progressive leaps without court orders"').
42. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 69, 515 S.E.2d 535, 541 (1999).
2005]
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a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political
systems, and of history and governmental processes; and 3)
academic and vocational skills. 3
After 101 days in trial over a period of sixteen months, Judge Thomas W. Cooper
has heard testimony from seventr witnesses." Judge Cooper hopes to render his
opinion in the summer of 2005."
m. THE LEGITIMACY OF PURSUING EDUCATIONAL REFORM THROUGH THE COURTS
A. Education Reform Litigation Enforces Destabilization Rights
Professor Charles Sabel and Professor William Simon's theory of
destabilization rights helps to explain why educational reform efforts developed in
the South Carolina courts. In their article, Sabel and Simon outline how "public
law litigation" serves as a catalyst to institutional change and "democratic
accountability."" According to Sabel and Simon, educational adequacy claims
assert "destabilization rights."47 Destabilization rights, they say, are "claims to
unsettle and open up public institutions that have chronically failed to meet their
obligations and that are substantially insulated from the normal processes of
political accountability." A prima facie case for destabilization rights involves
both 1) "failure to meet standards" and 2) "political blockage."49 Some South
Carolina politicians have indicated that the plaintiffs in Abbeville assert a prima
facie case. For example, State Senator John Land lamented that South Carolina's
failure to meet standards is typical:
Before we adequately funded our prisons, the federal court had to
tell us to do it. Before we integrated our schools, the court had to
tell us to do it. There are too many times when our Legislature
did not do what it should have done, and the courts had to
intervene. It's the same old thing over and over again.50
In her testimony for the plaintiffs, Representative Gilda Cobb-Hunter agreed that
the General Assembly would not act to improve education unless compelled by the
43. Id. at 68-69, 515 S.E.2d at 540 (citing Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Leandro
v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Randolph County Bd. of Educ. v. Adams, 467 S.E.2d 150 (W.Va
1995)).
44. Bill Robinson & Ellyde Roko, Closing Arguments Scheduled Today; But Resolution of Issue
Might be Years Away, THE STATE (Columbia, SC), Dec. 9, 2004, at Al.
45. Id.
46. Sabel & Simon, supra note 33, at 1016.
47. Id. at 1020.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1062.
50. James T. Hammond, Poor Schools Renew Battle for Funding, GREENVILLE NEWS (S.C.), July
28, 2003, at 8A.
[Vol. 56: 761
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court."1 She also testified that the General Assembly did not fully fund its own
educational initiatives.52
Speaking to the second element of political blockage, Land asserted "South
Carolina is two states: the rich state of South Carolina and the poor State of South
Carolina"; to this, Professor David J. Garrow adds, "[F]irm majorities in the
Republican-controlled state House and state Senate have no interest in eliminating
the disparity."53 As a witness for the plaintiffs, State Senator John Matthews opined
that the poor, rural districts in South Carolina exercise diminished influence in the
General Assembly. 4
B. Separation of Powers
Despite objections framed in separation of powers terms by opponents of
adequacy litigation, the state courts are appropriate venues for education reform.
The separation of powers doctrine considers the branches of the federal government
as "coordinate, independent, and coequal" with separate and distinct governmental
powers." The doctrine assumes that each branch must not exercise powers
properly delegated to another branch.
In Abbeville, the South Carolina Supreme Court acted within the bounds of its
power, albeit with some hesitation, when it interpreted the education clause. As the
court recognized, "[iut is the duty of this Court to interpret and declare the meaning
of the Constitution."56 Nonetheless, it appears that the court was not entirely
comfortable giving meaning to the right. The court was careful to note the
following:
We recognize that we are not experts in education, and we do not
intend to dictate the programs utilized in our public schools.
Instead, we have defined, within deliberately broad parameters,
the outlines of the constitution's requirement of minimally
adequate education ....
... We do not intend by this opinion to suggest to any party
that we will usurp the authority of [the legislative] branch to
determine the way in which educational opportunities are
delivered to the children of our State. We do not intend the courts
of this State to become super-legislatures or super-school
boards."
51. Tom Truitt, Law, Justice, and the Constitution: South Carolina's Unfilfilled Dream, South
Carolina Association of School Administrators (May 3, 2004), at
http://www.scasa.org/TrialDay_65.doc. In his series available through the South Carolina Association
of School Administrator's web site, Dr. Tom Truitt reports his observations of the trial in Manning, SC.
52. Id.; see also Hammond, supra note 30.
53. David J. Garrow, Clarendon County in Black & White: A Visit to the Home ofBriggs v. Elliot,
50 Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 237,244 (2004).
54. Tom Truitt, Law, Justice, and the Constitution: South Carolina's Unfulfilled Promises, South
Carolina Association of School Administrators (Sept. 8, 2003), at
http.//www.scasa.org/TrialDay_ 15 .doc.
55. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 246 (1998).
56. Abbeville County Sch. Dist v. State, 335 S.C. 58,67,515 S.E.2d 535,539 (1999) (citing State
ex rel. Rawlinson v. Ansel, 76 S.C. 395, 57 S.E. 185 (1907)).
57. Id. at69, 515 S.E.2d at 540-41.
2005]
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North Carolina expressed a similar concern in Leandro but nonetheless set out a
more specific definition with more concrete guidelines for the court on remand."8
Given the South Carolina Supreme Court's self-acknowledged "duty to interpret
and declare the meaning of [the education] clause," its apparent deference to the
legislature in defining the constitutional right is misplaced. 9
Judge Cooper should not be reluctant to hold that the state fails to meet its
constitutional duty because of perceived separation of powers constraints. The
federal separation of powers doctrine does not automatically apply in individual
states: "As far as local governments are concerned, there is no natural law of
separation of powers, and the powers of local governments are separate only insofar
as the state constitution makes them separate." According to Professor Helen
Hershkoff, significant differences between state and federal systems merit more
judicial activism at the state level.6 ' For example, while federal powers are limited
and constrained by the United States Constitution, "state constitutions often include
positive rights and regulatory norms" that "engage state courts in substantive areas
that have historically been outside the [federal judiciary's] domain."62 South
Carolina's education clause confers such a positive right on its citizens.6a As
written, it resembles a "broad administrative code[] that invites and depend[s] on
judicial involvement for [its] interpretation and enforcement.'
When evaluating the proper role of the judiciary within the state, it is important
to note that while federal judges are appointed for life, state judges serve for limited
terms. In South Carolina, the General Assembly elects and reelects state court
judges.6 Therefore, far from being insulated from "political accountability,"" state
judges depend on the legislature for their continued appointments. Another
58. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259-61 (N.C. 1997); see also Hoke County Bd. of Educ.
v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 390-91 (N.C. 2004) (describing the detailed instructions given by the trial
court in Leandro).
59. Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 67, 515 S.E.2d at 540 (citing State ex rel Rawlinson v. Ansel, 6 S.C.
395, 57 S.E.2d 185 (1907)); see also Kagan, supra note 34, at 2251 (allowing the legislature to define
adequacy "delegates judicial authority to the legislature without constitutional basis").
60. 16A AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 275 (1998). Although South Carolina's constitution
contains a separation of powers provision in article I, section 8, according to James Underwood, South
Carolina has a deeply-rooted history of legislative dominance that is tempered somewhat by a tradition
of judicial review that developed in the state "long before [it] mature[d] ... in the federal system."
JAMES L. UNDERWOOD, THE CONsITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 27 (1986).
61. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues ": Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1887-90 (2001).
62. Id. at 1889-90.
63. "The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free
public schools open to all children in the State and shall establish, organize and support such other
public institutions of learning, as may be desirable." S.C. CONsT. art. XI, § 3.
64. See Hershkoff, supra note 61, at 1891; see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801
N.E.2d 326,349 (N.Y. 2003) ("Courts are... well suited to interpret and safeguard constitutional rights
and review challenged acts of our co-equal branches of government-not in order to make policy but
in order to assure the protection of constitutional rights.").
65. S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 8, 13.
66. Michael Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV.
73, 85 (2000) ("Many of the Framers harbored deep concerns about the potential for a judicial branch
wholly insulated from direct political accountability which, in turn, could generate a tyrannical
superlegislature."). Such concerns are diminished in a state like South Carolina where the General
Assembly elects and reelects state judges.
[Vol. 56: 761
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important factor is the sophistication and fact-finding ability of the legislature.
Unlike Congress, state legislatures are not necessarily better equipped to analyze
policy issues relative to the courts. 7
At the remedial stage, courts are well-advised to defer, to the extent necessary,
to the legislature.s The courts find themselves walking a fine line between
deferring too much, thus allowing political abuses to remain in play, and exerting
too much control over traditional legislative functions.69 Striking the appropriate
balance is important, and the separation of powers doctrine is flexible enough to
allow such a balance. 0 Although the court's ongoing role at the remedial level has
the most potential to blur traditional notions of the separation of powers doctrine,
both the court and the legislature have the benefit of observing and drawing from
the relative successes and failures of other states as they collaborate toward
reform.
7'
C. Applying the Lessons of Other States' Experiences: The Experimentalist
Approach
In analyzing Abbeville's path, the experiences of other states are illustrative.
An experimentalist approach facilitates the progression of educational reform
movements in the courts.72 Sabel and Simon describe the experimentalist approach
as a "process of disciplined comparison ... designed to facilitate learning by
directing attention to the practices of the most successful peer institutions.""
Although Sabel and Simon discuss the experimentalist approach with regard to
remedial development, the process of "disciplined comparison" seems relevant at
67. "[Tihe legislature's comparative advantage over courts in addressing complex policy questions
is less pronounced in many states than in the federal system, because state legislatures often lack the
research resources that Congress has." Kagan, supra note 34, at 2258. The parties in the current
installment of Abbeville have provided the circuit court with a voluminous record of expert testimony on
remand. In contrast, the South Carolina General Assembly declined to consider Representative Gilda
Cobb-Hunter's bill to study school finance in 1999. Truitt, supra note 51 (May 3, 2004), at
http://www.scasa.org/TrialDay_65.doc.
68. Courts and policymakers are increasingly concerned with decisions that lead to extensive
judicial oversight and cause the courts to become entangled in possible policy failures. See, e.g., Heise,
supra note 66, at 98-103 (arguing against active judicial participation based on the experiences of New
Jersey and Texas).
69. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 29, at 280.
70. "[Tjhe modem view of separation of powers rejects the metaphysical abstractions and reverts
instead to a more pragmatic, flexible, functional approach, giving recognition to the fact that there may
be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the three powers of government." 16A AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 251 (1998).
71. The active and entangled roles assumed by courts in New Jersey and Texas are generally
disfavored. See Heise, supra note 66, at 99-103. Ohio's reform efforts were thwarted, however, due
to the court's indecision about its proper role and its difficulty in defining "adequacy." See First & De
Luca, supra note 6, at 185-86. On the other hand, Kentucky has had a positive experience with reform
litigation. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 29, at 205-06.
72. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 33, at 1019.
73. Id. Both state and national level peer institution successes are relevant. Successful school
systems within and outside the state can provide a model for reform.
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all stages in adequacy cases.74 In drawing support from other jurisdictions, the
South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Abbeville suggests a tentative
acceptance of the experimentalist approach. The court drew exclusively from the
precedents of other states in interpreting its constitutional clause and crafting its
definition of adequacy.7 The judicial collaboration occurring from state to state in
opinions addressing rights and remedies legitimizes the resulting educational
reforms. Therefore, in its future opinions the supreme court should not hesitate to
rely on the precedent and experiences of other state courts and legislatures.
IV. DEFINING ADEQUACY
Defining the meaning of a constitutional right is one of the court's most
important and challenging tasks. Defining adequacy under the Constitution is one
of the most crucial steps in guiding the case toward an outcome, because it sets the
bar for the parties' arguments on the merits and sets the stage for a remedy.76 In
spite of this task's importance, and perhaps because of it, courts and commentators
have grappled extensively with defining educational adequacy.
77
According to Liebman and Sabel, "an adequate education is one that meets the
demands of contemporary society.178  Many courts now define educational
adequacy in terms of providing students with the skills necessary to compete in a
global economy.79 For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court defined educational
adequacy in terms of the provision of seven "capacities," including: "sufficient oral
and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and
rapidly changing civilization" and "sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills
to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.""0 The definition articulated
by the Kentucky court and replicated in part by other states demonstrates a
historical current running through today's court opinions; the seven capacities are
based on standards the National Educational Association articulated in 1918." This
historical consensus militates against defining educational adequacy in minimalist
terms.8 2
Courts rely on various sources in order to conceptualize educational adequacy.
Some courts defer to existing legislative standards or leave the issue of defining
adequacy to the legislature entirely.83 Most courts, on the other hand, generate their
74. See id. An experimentalist approach in all stages of adequacy litigation seems relevant in light
of the intimate connection Sabel and Simon describe between remedy and right. See id. at 1055 ("The
remedy is an elaboration of the rights in question"). In this way, the development of the right shapes
the development of the remedy.
75. See Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 68-69, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1999).
76. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 33, at 1055 ("the remedy arises from a reflective effort to give
meaning to the right").
77. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 363-64 (N.Y. 2003) (Read, J.,
dissenting); First & De Luca, supra note 6; Verstegen, supra note 33; Kagan, supra note 34.
78. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 29, at 205.
79. See Verstegen, supra note 33, at 508-12 (discussing educational adequacy definitions of
Vermont, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and New York), 527-28.
80. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
81. First & De Luca, supra note 6, at 207-08.
82. See Verstegan, supra note 33, at 507-08.
83. Kagan, supra note 34, at 2248.
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own definitions. Massachusetts, for example, relied on voluminous historical
writings and legislative history in support of its defmition." In crafting their
definitions, however, state courts often borrow from decisions in other states. The
definitions that emerge establish those resources and skills deemed necessary for
realizing an adequate education.'6 Courts have described these resources and skills
in terms of "inputs" and "outputs." ' Input describes the resources that support a
state's education system, such as funding, facilities, teachers, curriculum, and
educational materials."8  Output relates to different measures of student
performance, such as skills-based test results and graduation rates.89
Drawing from cases in other jurisdictions, the South Carolina Supreme Court
defined the General Assembly's duty by requiring that it provide students with the
following: "adequate and safe facilities in which they have the opportunity to
acquire: 1) the ability to read, write, and speak the English language, and
knowledge of mathematics and physical science; 2) a fundamental knowledge of
economic, social, and political systems, and of history and governmental processes;
and 3) academic and vocational skills."'  The bulk of the court's definition
implicates outputs--sets of skills that when acquired reflect a minimally adequate
education. The only explicit input requirement calls for "adequate and safe
facilities."'"
Despite borrowing language from other courts' adequacy definitions, the South
Carolina Supreme Court's definition does not echo the goal of civic preparation that
runs through these other opinions.92 In fact, when compared to the opinions to
which the supreme court cites, South Carolina's definition is much less substantive.
The court provides little insight into the purpose of a minimally adequate education
and only offers a skeletal description of the definition's elements. South Carolina
courts must understand and articulate what adequacy means in the educational
context in order to ensure the achievement of meaningful reform. 3
84. McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
85. Id. at 618-19, and Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997), among others, echo the
definition provided in Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
86. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979) (discussing student "supportive
services" and student "capacities" as elements of a "thorough and efficient" system of schools).
87. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 333 (N.Y. 2003)
(discussing educational "inputs" and "outputs").
88. Id. at 332-36; Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 386 (N.C. 2004)
89. Campaignfor Fiscal Equity, Inc., 801 N.E.2d at 336-40; Hoke, 599 S.E.2d at 384.
90. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 68-69, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1999) (citing
Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186; McD uffy, 615 N.E.2d 516; Leandro, 488 S.E.2d 249; Randolph County Bd. of
Educ. v. Adams, 467 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1995)).
91. Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 68-69, 515 S.E.2d at 540.
92. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 548 ("m[The Commonwealth has a duty to provide education .. to
prepare [students] to participate as free citizens of a free State to meet the needs and interests of a
republican government"); Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254 ("An education that does not serve the purpose of
preparing students to participate and compete in the society in which they live and work is devoid of
substance and is constitutionally inadequate."); Randolph, 467 S.E.2d at 158 ("[L]egaUy recognized
elements" of "thorough and efficient" include "knowledge of government to the extent that the child will
be equipped as a citizen to make informed choices among persons and issues that affect his own
governance.").
93. See First & De Luca, supra note 6, at 197-200 (discussing the confusion encountered by Ohio
courts in trying to define and react to the meaning of adequacy).
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V. EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
"In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."
A. Defining Opportunity in the Courts
In presenting its case, the state focused on the word "opportunity" in the South
Carolina Supreme Court's 1999 Abbeville opinion. The state maintained that
because some children in the plaintiff districts are able to meet education standards,
all children have the "opportunity" to do so. 9' The state argued that it fulfilled its
duty and shifted the blame for poor educational outputs to other parties. 96 For
example, the state asserted that children in the plaintiff districts are unable to take
advantage of the opportunities the state provides because they come to school with
deficits related to socio-economic status. The state also attempted to shift the
burden to the districts by alleging that they mismanaged funds received from the
state. Finally, the state argued that it has standards in place, and with more time the
system will improve.97
Other state courts recognize a broader standard for opportunity and the state's
duty to provide it. For example, New York's highest court rejected an argument by
the state that closely resembled South Carolina's reading of "opportunity" in the
definition of a minimally adequate education. In Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc.
v. State, the New York Court of Appeals evaluated defense arguments concerning
the state's burden for providing educational opportunity.9" The state attempted to
distinguish between providing an adequate education and providing the opportunit%
to obtain an adequate education, acknowledging responsibility only for the latter.
The court of appeals rejected the state's argument and clarified that the state's duty
was to ensure the opportunity was available to all students, including at-risk
students.'°
The North Carolina Supreme Court also found that at-risk students require
special attention from the state."0' In considering opportunity, "one size does not
fit all." Instruction tailored to the needs of at-risk students rightly falls within the
ambit of the state's constitutional responsibility; research demonstrates that good
teaching has a greater affect on improved educational performance than socio-
94. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
95. Tom Truitt, Law, Justice, and the Constitution: South Carolina's Unfilfilled Dream, South
Carolina Association of School Administrators (July 28, 2003), at
http'//www.scasa.org/TrialDay_01.doc (discussing the defense's opening statement). Recall that the
South Carolina Supreme Court, in construing the constitution's education clause, defined the General
Assembly's duty to provide a minimally adequate education in terms of giving students "the opportunity
to acquire" a broad list of academic skills. Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 68, 515 S.E.2d at 540.
96. See Bill Robinson, State's Defense Rests Case in School Trial; Eight Witnesses Testify That
More Money Won't Assure Better Grades, THE STATE (Columbia, SC), Oct. 2, 2004, at B5.
97. Truitt, supra note 51 (July 28, 2003) (describing the defenses opening statement), at
http'//www.scasa.orgfTrial Day 01 .doc.
98. 801 N.E.2d 326, 337 (N.Y. 2003).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 389-90 (N.C. 2004).
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economic status."0 2 Arguments in favor of recognizing the state's duty to provide
the opportunity for minimally adequate education regardless of socio-economic
confounds should not be a hard pill for the legislature to swallow given the purpose
of its own Educational Finance Act:
To guarantee to each student in the public schools of South
Carolina the availability of at least minimum educational
programs and services appropriate to his needs, and which are
substantially equal to those available to other students with
similar needs and reasonably comparable from a program
standpoint to those students of all other classifications,
notwithstanding eographic differences and varying local
economic factors.°3
Placing the blame on the local districts is also untenable in light of other courts'
opinions.' The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that because of the state's
constitutional duty to provide educational opportunity, it was also responsible for
overseeing the use of resources on a local level.'05 Thus, the state could not pass
the blame for inadequacy on to another governmental entity. Ultimately, the
constitutional burden falls on the state itself, not on lower entities. If educational
opportunity is thwarted because of inefficiencies at any level, the state should
remain accountable. 6
B. Opportunity to Learn in Light of High-Stakes Testing
"High-stakes tests are examinations that are used to grant rewards for passing
or impose extreme sanctions for failing. The stakes can be high for a school
102. A study by Harold Wenglinsky regarding the effects of educational reform found that "the
combined effects of the relevant reforms in teaching and the professional development of teachers is
greater than the contribution to performance of the students' social and economic status." Liebman &
Sabel, supra note 29, at 226.
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-20-30 (Law. Co-op 1990) (language unchanged in S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-20-30 (West 2004)), cited in Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 65, 515
S.E.2d 535, 539 (1999).
104. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 801 N.E.2d at 343 ("mhe State remains responsible
when the failures of its agents sabotage the measures by which it secures for its citizens their
constitutionally-mandated rights."); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d
516, 548 (Mass. 1993) ("While it is clearly within the power of the Commonwealth to delegate some
of the implementation of the duty to local governments, such power does not include a right to abdicate
the obligation imposed on magistrates and Legislatures... by the Constitution.").
105. Hoke, 599 S.E.2d at 389.
106.
If the deficiencies are due to a lack of effective management practices, then it is
the State's responsibility to see that effective management practices are put in
place ....
The State of North Carolina cannot shirk or delegate its ultimate
responsibility to provide each and every child in the State with the equal
opportunity to obtain a sound basic education ....
Tico A. Almeida, Note, Refocusing School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children: Leandro v. State
of North Carolina, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 525, 542 (2004).
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district, a single campus, a teacher, or an individual student.9'0 7 South Carolina
implemented a high-stakes testing system in 1998 with the Education
Accountability Act (EAA).e's The state contended that it already addressed
educational reform through the EAA. Moreover, the state argued that it just needs
more time to realize changes the accountability model contemplates."° However,
the EAA is simply a formalized means of transferring the state's burden to the
children and the schools. Although the goals of the EAA are laudable," as the
system stands, local districts bear the burden of making it work unless chronic and
repeated failures occur--only then does the state step in to offer assistance in the
form of grants."' The EAA uses standardized tests to measure whether students
and schools are meeting the state's goals."2 The problem is that the state offers
little assistance to ensure that students have the opportunity to learn the material
tested." 3 Furthermore, some commentators argue that high-stakes tests like those
used in South Carolina will not necessarilyimprove educational outcomes: "[T]ests
do not produce improved teaching and learning, any more than a thermometer
reduces fever.""' 4 On the contrary, evidence that high-stakes testing leads to
increased drop-out rates indicates that such testing is detrimental."I Higher
standards are not likely to help improve educational outcomes if the state does not
provide the students the opportunity to achieve.
Failure to deal properly with the meaning of "opportunity" now may lead to
headaches for South Carolina later because due process requires the state to provide
students with the opportunity to learn. Members of the Education Oversight
Committee appointed under the EAA seem to agree: "It would be unfair to fail to
provide students with the level of knowledge and skills they need to be successful
in their lives and work."'" 6 In fact, commentators posit that due process questions
about the opportunity to learn may comprise a fourth wave of reform litigation."7
107. Mark Littleton, High Stakes Testing, 187 ED. L. REP. 389, 389 (2004).
108. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-18-100 to -1930 (West 2004).
109. Truitt, supra note 95 (describing the defense's opening statement).
110. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-18-100 to -110 (West 2004).
111. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-18-1500 to -1930.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-18-300 to -370.
113. Sandra Lindsay, Deputy Superintendent for Curriculum and Instruction, testified as to the
lack of funding for the Education Accountability Act. Tom Truitt, Law. Justice, and the Constitution:
South Carolina's Unfulfilled Dream, South Carolina Association of School Administrators (Oct. 6,
2003), at httpl/www.scasa.org/TrialDay_29.doc. State Senator John Matthews also testified that a
staff development program for underachieving districts was never funded. Truitt, supra note 54.
114. Littleton, supra note 107, at 391 (quoting Jay P. Heubert, High-Stakes Testing and Civil
Rights: Standards ofAppropriate Test Use and a Strategy for Enforcing Them, in RAISING STANDARDS
OR RAISING BARRIERS? 180 (Gary Orfield & Mindy L. Komhaber eds., 2001)).
115. Id. When asked about PACT standards under the Education Accountability Act, Rex
Whitcomb, a former principal specialist in Marion County, testified that he believed that increasing the
standards for the exit exam would cause more students to drop out. Tom Truitt, Law, Justice, and the
Constitution: South Carolina 's UnfulfilledDream, South Carolina Association of School Administrators
(Aug. 1, 2003), at http://www.scasa.orgITrialDay_05.doc.
116. South Carolina Education Oversight Committee, Why is the Rigor of the Ratings Increasing
This Year? Twelve Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.sceoc.org/ Performance.htm (last visited
Jan. 10, 2005).
117. Maurice R. Dyson, Leave No Child Behind: Normative Proposals to Link Educational
Adequacy Claims and High Stakes Assessment Due Process Challenges, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1,
32 (2002); see also John R. Munich, High-Stakes Testing: The Next Round of Finance Litigation, 18
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States that employ high-stakes testing as part of their educational accountability
systems have already begun to face procedural due process challenges from
students who assert that their states did not provide the opportunity to learn the
material tested by state competency exams.
In Debra P. v. Turlington,"s although the plaintiffs did not ultimately prevail,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that when the
State of Florida established and maintained an educational system, it "created a
mutual expectation that the student who is successful will graduate with a
diploma."'  This expectation amounts to an implied property right that is subject
to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court went on to hold that if
graduation is predicated on passing a competency examination, the exam must
demonstrate "curricular validity."'20 In other words, the exam must test material
actually taught. Without curricular validity, a competency exam "cannot be said
to be rationally related to a state interest.""'
A South Carolina student who is held back under the EAA may have an even
stronger due process claim against the state because the South Carolina Supreme
Court recognizes the state's duty to provide a minimally adequate education under
the state constitution. 22 Indeed, if the state is responsible for providing a minimally
adequate education, it seems all the more unfair that a student should be held back
under the state's accountability system because the state failed to allow the child
the opportunity to learn. Such a system invites the courts to hold the state
accountable. If South Carolina schools actually carry out the mandate of the EAA
and retain students without holding the state responsible, questions regarding
educational opportunity will not go away. On the contrary, if the system remains
unchanged, the state should expect the issue to arise in a new class of suits.
VI. EDUCATION FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD
"Education, in our competitive global economy, has become the
dividing line between those who are able to move ahead and those
who lag behind.""12
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognizes that "the purpose of providing
a public education is to benefit not just the individual receiving it, but also the
public at large."'"4 Thus, it is curious that the state takes such a resistant stance
ME. B.J. 202, 204-07 (2003) (providing recent examples of due process challenges for failure to
provide an adequate opportunity to learn and implying that more such due process challenges are on
the horizon).
118. 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981).
119. Id. at 404.
120. Id. at 405.
121. Id. at 406.
122. In Debra P., however, the Fifth Circuit did not decide whether the Florida Constitution
required the state to provide a school system. Id. at 404.
123. President William J. Clinton, The Budget Message of the President, in BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATEs GOVERNMENT: FIscAL YEAR 2001 3, 5 (United States Government Printing Office
2000).
124. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 66, 515 S.E.2d 535, 539 (1999).
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toward education reform and is willing to place the blame on particular children and
government entities.'
The importance of education to our society may be best understood in terms of
its relationship to a global economy. In 1983, the National Commission on
Excellence in Education presented its findings regarding the quality of education
in America inA Nation at Risk: The Imperative for EducationalReform. The report
addressed the effects of educational deficits on the nation:
Our Nation is at risk. Once unchallenged preeminence in
commerce, industry, science and technological innovation is
being overtaken by competitors throughout the world.
Knowledge, learning, information and skilled intelligence are
the new raw materials of international commerce.... [T]o keep
and improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in world
markets, we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of our
educational system for the benefit of all-old and young alike,
affluent and poor, majority and minority ....
... A high level of shared education is essential to a free,
democratic society and to the fostering of a common culture,
especially in a country that prides itself on pluralism and
individual freedom. 26
In its recommendations regarding leadership and fiscal support, the report provided
the following: "State and local officials, including school board members,
governors, and legislators, have the primary responsibility for financing and
governing the schools, [sic] and should incorporate the reforms we propose in their
educational policies and fiscal planning."'
2
Individual states recognize the correlation between economic performance and
education, as their reform movements and adequacy definitions demonstrate. 2 8
Although South Carolina's definition of educational adequacy lacks mention of the
goals of educational adequacy, the business community is aware of the importance
of education for the economic development of the state. In December 2003,
125. Unfortunately, legislative recalcitrance hinders the success of educational reform in the
courts. Almeida, supra note 106, at 557.
126. National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk (1983), at
http'//www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
127. Id., at http//www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/recomm.html.
128.
The stirrings of Kentucky's civil society date to the early 1980s, when political,
civic, and business communities acknowledged the catastrophic economic and
social costs of a school system that ranked nationally near the bottom on all
significant criteria ....
... Ashland Oil, the third largest employer in the state, . . . like many leading
firms in Kentucky, was convinced that education reform was a precondition to
attracting and retaining high quality employees.
Liebman & Sabel, supra note 29, at 251-52. According to Liebman and Sabel, educational reform
began in Texas when "the gap between the modern economy's demands for an educated workforce and
the state education system's inability to produce one was alarming enough to prompt formation of a
reform coalition of business leaders and citizens' groups." Id. at 233.
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Professor Michael Porter presented the Phase I findings of his study, The South
Carolina Competitiveness Initiative, in conjunction with the University of South
Carolina's Economic Outlook Conference. 912  Porter's study acknowledged that
South Carolina's "relatively poor educational system[,] and the resulting limited
skill set in the workforce," impede the quality of its business environment. 3 '
Improving education and workforce training were among the recommendations
Porter offered for the state.'3 ' In order to implement his recommendations, Porter
urged that members from the business community, government, and academia form
leadership groups to address the issues. 32 Such a plan is consistent with the
collaborative remedial approaches implicated by Sabel and Simon's destabilization
rights and experimentalist approach.'33
As other states recognize the importance of educational reform for civic
development, it becomes more important that South Carolina courts and leaders
make strides toward educational reform. Otherwise, the state will continue to lag
behind.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the Abbeville case progresses toward a circuit court ruling-and later on
possible appeal-the courts, legislators, and South Carolina's citizens should bear
in mind that educational reform through the courts is both necessary and
appropriate. The deeper meanings of adequacy and opportunity imply that the state
has a broad duty to provide for the education of all of South Carolina's students in
order to benefit all South Carolinians. The courts must not shy away from an active
yet collaborative role, because such a role is legitimate given the dire state of
education in South Carolina, the flexibility of separation of powers, and the guiding
current of experimentalism running through other court opinions. In order to avoid
extensive judicial oversight, the court would be well-advised to
"articulat[e] . . . both constitutional principles and feasible expectations of
complying with them."'34 In doing so, South Carolina courts will need to assert a
slightly more active role in defining the goals of a "minimally adequate education"
under the constitution. Both courts and legislators must recognize that adequacy
relates to competencies that will prepare South Carolina students for the rigors of
life in the global economy. As soon as the courts and legislators realize that
opportunity requires more than the state currently provides, the General Assembly
will be able to take its first steps toward improving education in the state. Although
the state fervently denies that increased spending will help struggling school
districts provide academic success, 5 it is unclear whether using resources in
conjunction with the General Assembly's educational goals will fail to foster
improved results. Educational reform is possible for South Carolina if the courts,
129. MICHAEL E. PORTER, SouTH CAROLINA COMPETITIVENESS INIATIVE: PHASE [ PRESENTATION
(2003), avai/able at http//www.<alsouthcaona.com/teamcpdfs/pres/pdtmcwiter.pdf (last accessed Jan.
25,2005).
130. Id. at3.
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 46-49, 72-74 and accompanying text.
134. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 29, at 280.
135. Robinson, supra note 96.
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legislators, school districts, and the people recognize the challenge and then work
toward achieving a mininally adequate education for all South Carolina students.
Amanda S. Hawthorne
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